Is The War in Afghanistan a Lost Cause?

Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.

– General Stanley McChrystal, Commander U.S. Forces in Afghanistan (Aug. 30, 2009)

The more I read about Afghanistan, the more depressed I get.

What happened to the glory days back in 2001 when U.S. forces – in retaliation for the September 11^th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center — succeeded in “Operation Enduring Freedom” to defeat the Taliban in less than two months?  The U.S. began dropping bombs on the capital of Kabul on October 7^th and by December 6^th Kandahar, the last major city controlled by the Taliban and its spiritual birthplace, had fallen to U.S. forces.  

Afghanistan Chaos

Flash forward to the present:

Three-quarters of Afghanistan is under Taliban control (including Kandahar)

Taliban insurgents can infiltrate the capital of Kabul at will and commit terrorist acts

Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai – who the U.S. hand-picked to run the country back in 2001 – made the following disturbing statements over the past week:

Blueprint for Victory in Afghanistan

Given this depressing background, how can the U.S. possibly win in Afghanistan?  In August 2009, General McChrystal submitted a report laying out a game plan. First, the old strategy of seizing territory and killing Taliban insurgents needs to end. Doubling down on the old strategy focuses on force and “misses the point entirely.”

Rather, a new counterinsurgency strategy must focus on winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people.  To do this, U.S. forces must protect the people from the “dual threat” of: (1) Taliban violence and intimidation; and (2) a corrupt national Afghan government. Furthermore, the Afghan people must be assured that the international military coalition is committed to staying the course in Afghanistan for as long as it takes to achieve its long-term objective of a peaceful and prosperous country that doesn’t threaten the world. Otherwise, the people will not cooperate now because they fear it would mark them for Taliban persecution later when the coalition leaves.

The coalition must also minimize civilian casualties (i.e., collateral damage) even if it means letting Taliban bad guys escape. McChrystal said that the U.S. needs to interact more closely –- and continuously — with the Afghan people so that they feel secure at all times and from all threats. Such continuous involvement requires “more resources” such as troops, intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance (ISR), and funds for basic human services, a fair justice system, and economic development.  He says a surge of troops alone will not win the war, but “under-resourcing could lose it.”

Focus on the Cities

Even with more troops, McChrystal says that Afghanistan is too large for coalition forces to be everywhere. Consequently, the coalition should focus resources where:

they will have the greatest effect on the people. This will generally be in those specific geographical areas that represent key terrain. For the counterinsurgent, the key terrain is generally where the population lives and works. [The coalition] will initially focus on critical high-population areas that are contested or controlled by insurgents, not because the enemy is present, but because it is here that the population is threatened by the insurgency.

Nation Building is the Hard Part

Simultaneous with the short-term need to provide adequate resources for security and quality of life improvements, the coalition must implement the long-term objective of nation building: training and empowering local Afghan institutions (government and security forces) to take over from coalition forces. The Afghan people want to control their own destiny and the coalition doesn’t want to stay in Afghanistan any longer than necessary.

With regard to Afghan security forces, McChrystal says:

The Afghan National Army (ANA) must accelerate growth to the present target strength of 134,000 by Fall 2011 with the institutional flexibility to continue that growth to a new target ceiling of 240,000. The target strength of the Afghan National Police (ANP) must be raised to 160,000. This will require additional mentors, trainers, partners and funds. The ANP suffers from a lack of training, leaders, resources, equipment, and mentoring.

The ANA goal of 134,000 men seems impossible to attain by 2011 given the fact that nearly 30% of members either desert or fail to re-enlist each year. The ANA routinely meets only half of its monthly recruiting goal despite Afghanistan’s 40% unemployment rate. In addition, sources estimate that 15% of the ANA and up to 60% of the ANP in some provinces are drug addicts. Even Afghan President Karzai admitted at a January conference in London that the training of Afghan security forces would take anywhere between five and 15 years!

The last piece of McChrystal’s long-term solution is the hardest: increasing public confidence in the national Afghan government. McChrystal provided some possible carrots and stick solutions, but he’s a military man, not a nation builder.  Frankly, I don’t believe anyone can create a democratic and honest government in a society based on tribal conflicts and war lords.

Obama’s Compromise Means Failure

Still, McChrystal’s report provided the best – and perhaps – only blueprint for winning in Afghanistan. Did President Obama follow it? Not really. In a December 1^st speech at West Point, he did so only partly, which is the same as not following it. McChrystal’s plan required a full commitment, not a compromise. Obama agreed to send 30,000 more troops (on top of the 67,000 already there) to Afghanistan by May 2010, which is 10,000 less than McChrystal was seeking.  Obama set a deadline of July 2011 for beginning to bring U.S. troops home, which goes directly against McChrystal’s advice to show the Afghan people that the coalition had the staying power necessary to defeat the Taliban insurgency. According to a report in Foreign Policy Magazine, the Pakistani government interpreted this July 2011 troop withdrawal deadline as proof that the U.S. was prepared to lose in Afghanistan:

Pakistan‘s reaction to Obama’s speech was to order its top military intelligence service, the ISI, to immediately begin rebuilding and strengthening covert ties to the Afghan Taliban in anticipation of their eventual return to power.

With Friends Like Karzai, Who Needs Enemies?

On ending corruption within the Afghan government, President Obama raised the issue in his December West Point speech, saying that “the days of providing a blank check are over.” He has chastised Mr. Karzai for pardoning five convicted drug traffickers last July (one of those pardoned was the nephew of his election campaign manager) and for issuing a presidential decree in February permitting him to appoint all of the members of the UN/Afghan joint electoral complaints commission (ECC). Karzai stirred hopes of change in January when he fired Kabul’s mayor, who had been convicted of corruption, but his recent anti-U.S. outbursts are a clear indication that Karzai is not really getting the message. Jamie Metzl, who served on former President Bill Clinton’s National Security Council, recently wrote an op-ed piece entitled “Kabul’s major problem has a name: Hamid Karzai.” He concludes:

Unless Karzai’s regime changes course, there is no justification for NATO member countries to risk the lives of their soldiers and commit other valuable resources to the struggle in Afghanistan if the Afghan government’s corruption and legitimacy deficit make current progress unsustainable and achievement of NATO’s goals impossible.  

Waiting for Karzai to leave office isn’t an option: he just won (perhaps fraudulently) a second five-year term as president.

Why are the Marines in Marja?

Regarding McChrystal’s recommendation that troops be focused on “critical high-population areas,” the current military campaign in Marja, a desolate backwater area in Helmand Province, seems to be a complete rejection of his advice. Granted, Marja is a well-known hub of the heroin trade, but McChrystal was quoted in early March as saying the province was “not particularly valuable.”

Furthermore, the campaign is not going well. In late March, a leader of the marines in Marja was quoted as saying that the Taliban have “re-seized control and the momentum in a lot of ways.” If the marines are having trouble in a backwater like Marja, how are they going to succeed in Kandahar? A Kandahar offensive is scheduled to take place this summer and the Taliban may initially flee. But the Taliban are experts at strategic withdrawal, only to sneak back in later and wreak havoc.

Don’t Shoot the Messenger

I hate writing this article because I am a patriotic American like everyone else and want the U.S. to win. But I can’t ignore the facts staring me in the face. Afghanistan looks a lot like Vietnam:

• A corrupt and weak central government with no authority over rural areas;

• An ideological and committed insurgency that looks identical to the civilians you are trying to protect;

• Insurgent safe havens in neighboring countries;

• A thriving drug trade;

• Hostile terrain for conventional warfare; and

• No cultural tradition of democracy.

Instead of a nation-building success story in Afghanistan, the U.S. may have to settle for terrorist containment.

Let’s hope I’m wrong.

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