The sovereign-debt crisis has escalated since the spring, spreading from the periphery (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) toward the core (Italy and Spain). Nevertheless, the contagion hasn’t infected credit markets outside the EU.

Although most of the master limited partnerships (MLP) in our coverage universe have almost zero revenue exposure to European markets, a second credit crunch would impact the group. MLPs rely on issuing units (the MLP equivalent of shares) and selling bonds to finance new projects and acquisitions–credit is the lifeblood of distribution growth. On the whole, MLPs have reduced their reliance on short-term lines of credit, but another credit crunch would still deal the group a major blow.

Investors should tune out the noise and focus on a handful of indicators to gauge the health of the interbank lending market, the US corporate bond market and EU sovereign-debt markets.
 
The Interbank Market

The TED spread, or the difference between what banks and the US government pay to borrow for three months, rose from obscurity in 2008 and 2009 to become the most popular ways to gauge the health of the financial system and the interbank lending market. After Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in fall 2008, financial institutions hoarded cash and restricted interbank lending because of concerns about the solvency of their counterparties. The US TED spread spiked to more than 4.5 percent in mid-October 2008.

To keep tabs on the health of the EU financial system, we monitor the spread between the three-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR)–the rate major financial institutions in Europe charge each other to borrow money–and the yield on three-month German government debt. Check out this graph of US and EU TED spreads.


Source: Bloomberg

The US TED spread currently stands at 35 basis points (0.35 percent). This reading is above the long-term average but well under the high of almost 50 basis points registered in summer 2010. Though elevated relative to historic norms, the US TED spread is well short of its all-time high of more than 450 basis points.

On the other hand, the EU TED spread has spiked to more than 100 basis points in recent months–a higher reading than summer 2010, when the sovereign-debt crisis first made headlines. The EU interbank lending market has tightened, but conditions have yet to deteriorate to the point that banks effectively refuse to lend money to one another for fear of counterparty risk.

Thus far, the spillover from the EU interbank lending market to its US counterpart has remained muted. Investors should become more vigilant if the US TED spread breaks above 50 basis points in coming weeks

US Corporate Credit Markets

At the height of the 2008-09 financial crisis, the bond market was closed to rock-solid, investment-grade corporations. From September through November 2008, US corporations raised an average of just $37.5 billion per month by issuing bonds. That compares to an average of over $100 billion per month in the first six months of 2008. Check out this graph of monthly corporate bond issuance from early 2010 to present.


Source: Bloomberg

Some of the monthly variation in bond-market capital raised by US corporations reflects seasonal patterns. For example, issuance tends to tail off over the summer and during months with major holidays. But many corporations took a wait-and-see approach to raising debt capital this summer. In August, junk-rated companies issued a little more than $1 billion in total debt–easily the weakest month over this period.

Corporations tapped the bond markets regularly in the first half of the year, taking advantage of extraordinarily low borrowing rates to issue long-term debt. Even firms with credit ratings well into junk territory were able to raise debt capital at historically low rates. In short, many firms addressed their borrowing needs earlier in the year and took a break from the capital markets.

But corporate debt issuance has rebounded in September. Through Sept. 16, US corporations have already raised as much debt capital as they did in all of August.

When evaluating the health of corporate bond markets, you should also pay attention to the cost of credit.


Source: Bloomberg

This graph tracks the average yield on bonds issued by US industrial companies with AA, A-, BBB and BB- credit ratings from Standard & Poor’s. Corporate bond yields spiked across the board in late 2008 and early 2009, but junk-rated firms bore the brunt of the crisis. At one point, the average yield on a bond rated BB- hit almost 15 percent. Bond yields ticked higher in late 2010, reflecting an improvement in economic conditions that pushed up interest rates throughout the economy.

Although the cost of debt capital has increased slightly in recent months, the yields on investment-grade bonds are still lower than they were at the beginning of 2011. At these levels, even lower-quality borrowers can raise capital at reasonable rates.

Here’s a look at what all of this means for our Portfolio holdings. This table lists the all the bonds issued by our Portfolio holdings, as well as the current yield, the yield three months ago and the yield six months ago.


Source: Bloomberg

As you study this table, note that the yields on bonds issued by Conservative Portfolio holdings Enterprise Products Partners LP (NYSE: EPD) and Kinder Morgan Energy Partners LP (NYSE: KMP) have declined in recent months. For example, Enterprise Products Partners’ 6.45 percent bonds that mature in September 2040 currently yield less than 5.79 percent, down from 5.8 percent three months ago and 6.08 percent in mid-March.

The only member of the Aggressive Portfolio to issue bonds is Linn Energy LLC (NSDQ: LINE), a firm that Standard & Poor’s rates B+–several notches into junk territory. The yields on Linn Energy’s bonds have ticked up slightly in recent. For example, the MLP’s 9 7/8 bonds that mature in July 2018 currently yield 7.48 percent. That’s more than the 7.3 percent they yielded three months ago but well below the 8.15 percent they yielded 12 months ago.
 
Credit market conditions can change quickly, but there’s no evidence of a credit freeze-up or a significant spike in the cost of credit for our coverage universe.

EU Sovereign Debt and Financial Institutions

European banks are the latest casualties of the crisis, reflecting fears that these institutions have too much exposure to sovereign bonds issued by the fiscally weak PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). Investors worry that a sovereign default could overwhelm these banks’ capital reserves, necessitating another government bailout.


Source: Bank of International Settlements

This table breaks down of foreign claims of banks from the US, UK, Germany and France. These claims include direct exposure to sovereign bonds and debt issued by European corporations.

US banks have total foreign claims of almost $3.1 trillion, roughly 45 percent of which are from Europe. The majority of this exposure is to core EU economies such as Germany and France. As you can see, US banks’ direct exposure to the PIIGS is modest.

German and French banks, however, have far more direct exposure to the PIIGS. Note that this data is from March 31, 2011, and doesn’t reflect any moves financial institutions may have made to reduce their exposure to these fiscally challenged nations. Based on this data, it’s easy to understand why shares of prominent EU banks have sold off precipitously over the past few months.

Let’s consider the worst-case scenario. If Greece fails to secure its next tranche of aid, the country would be forced to default on its debt. Not only would this default ratchet up the pressure on the other fiscally weak nations in the eurozone, but banks would also be forced to raise significant amounts of capital after taking a haircut on these sovereign bonds. Some of these financial institutions would likely require a government bailout.

Although US banks’ have less direct exposure to the PIIGS, questions about the stability of Europe’s major financial institutions would heighten concerns about counterparty risks and push up borrowing costs in the interbank lending market.

Fortunately, this worst-case scenario likely won’t come to pass. EU leaders understand the potentially severe repercussions of a disorderly Greek default and will continue to address the problem. Although unpopular austerity measures have deepened Greece’s three-year recession, Prime Minister George Papandreou recently announced another round of budget cuts that will enable the country to meet the deficit reduction goals required by international lenders.

Moreover, the EU has already agreed to enhance the powers of the European Financial Stabilization Fund (EFSF), enabling the bailout fund administrators to reduce these nations’ borrowing costs by buying their sovereign bonds in the secondary market. Now, individual parliaments must approved the measure. On Sept. 29, the German parliament will vote on whether to approve this plan to expand the EFSF.

Moreover, the European Central Bank (ECB) has already started Italian and Spanish government debt on the secondary market in an effort to reduce the embattled nations’ borrowing costs.


Source: Bloomberg

The ECB’s efforts have paid off. When the yield on 10-year sovereign bonds issued by Italy and Spain topped 6 percent, the central bank entered the market and has lowered these yields to sustainable levels. Until European parliaments authorize the enhancements to the EFSF, the ECB has the wherewithal to combat pressures in these critical bond markets.

Although the EU and European banks would be able to weather a Greek or Portuguese default, the potential effects on Italy and Spain would prove too much to bear. Expect the ECB and EFSF to do what it takes to prevent the credit contagion from endangering Europe’s core economies and financial system. The approval of an expanded EFSF would be a welcome upside catalyst for European equities and would likely alleviate fears of a global credit crunch.

Bottom line: The potential fallout from a European sovereign default is frightful to ponder, but credit markets outside Europe haven’t ceased to function yet.

Newbies

MLP-specific factors have taken a backseat in recent weeks to the latest news from Europe.

In this environment, few investors are thinking about the latest initial public offerings (IPO). Ignoring this market is a huge mistake. You don’t need to be one of the lucky insiders to receive units before the MLP trades on a public exchange; some MLP IPOs are outstanding buys long after they go public.­­­­­­

We add all new IPOs to our How They Rate coverage universe and assign each name a buy, hold or sell rating based on our analysis of the company’s business and fundamentals. Partnerships often grow their distributions rapidly in their first two years as a public company.

For example, in its first two years as a publicly traded partnership, Williams Partners LP (NYSE: WPZ) boosted its quarterly payout to $0.575 per unit from $0.35 per unit. This growth was fueled by a series of asset drop-downs from its general partner, Williams Companies (NYSE: WMB). These deals helped the stock soar 80 percent from the close on its first full day of trading.

Conservative Portfolio recommendation Sunoco Logistics Partners LP (NYSE: SXL) enjoyed a similar pop. The refined products pipeline giant increased its payout 23 percent in its first eight quarters as a public company, and the stock gained 100 percent. There’s nothing like rapid distribution growth to attract investors’ attention.

Investing in MLP IPOs can be lucrative, but selectivity is critical to distinguishing the winners from the losers. Some new MLPs boast solid assets and a workable strategy to grow their distributions; others go public so their sponsors can exit their position and turn a profit. Understanding the difference between solid and questionable MLP IPOs requires taking a close look at the firm’s underlying assets and growth prospects.

Over the past year we’ve profiled nine MLP IPOs in MLP Profits, five of which warranted a buy rating. Of the five buy-rated MLP IPOs, only one has underperformed the Alerian MLP Index since we added it to our coverage universe. In fact, our average buy-rated MLP IPO has returned almost 11 percent and bested the Alerian MLP Index by more than 10 percent since we initiated coverage. In contrast, the MLPs we rated hold or sell posted a 21 percent loss.

Four new MLPs have started trading since we analyzed the last batch of MLP IPOs. Here’s a look at how they stack up.

Oiltanking Partners LP (NYSE: OILT) owns two major oil and refined products terminals, one in the Houston Ship Channel and the other in Beaumont, Texas.

Oil and refined products terminals generate steady, fee-based revenues. In Oiltanking Partners’ case, about 75 percent of its cash flows are locked in under capacity reservation deals. In a capacity reservation agreement, a major oil or natural gas company such as ExxonMobil Corp (NYSE: XOM) pays Oiltanking Partners for guaranteed access to storage capacity–regardless of whether the customer uses the facility. The average remaining duration of Oiltanking Partners’ contracts is a little more than six years.

The remaining 25 percent of the MLP’s cash flow can fluctuate slightly based on the volumes of oil and refined products stored at its facilities. About 20 percent of the firm’s cash flow comes from throughput fees Oiltanking Partners receives to accept delivery of a certain volume of crude oil on behalf of a customer. Ancillary services such as fuel blending account for the remaining 5 percent of the firm’s cash flow. None of these fees directly relates to the price of the commodities Oiltanking Partners transports and stores.

When demand for oil and refined products falls, demand for ancillary services and throughput might decline. But even during severe recessions, the volume of oil and refined products moving through the Gulf Coast refining network historically has deteriorated only modestly. Bottom line: Oiltanking Partners is a low-risk MLP.

But just because Oiltanking Partners’ cash flows are steady and primarily fee-based doesn’t mean the MLP lacks growth opportunities. The firm has two major avenues for growth: adding tanks and storage capacity at its existing terminals and the potential for drop-down transacrions from its parent and general partner (GP), Marquard & Bahls AG.

The MLP’s Houston terminal has total capacity of 12.1 million barrels, but Oiltanking Partners has leased additional acres adjacent to the facility through 2035. In total, the firm has identified the potential to add 7 million barrels of storage capacity to its facilities–provided that it can obtain long-term capacity reservation contracts from its customers. Building new assets based on demand rather than speculation is part and parcel with an MLP’s success.

The firm also owns a sizable tract of unused land near its 5.7 million-barrel Beaumont storage facility. This acreage could house another 20 million barrels of storage capacity. Management plans to add as much as 5.4 million barrels of capacity, demand permitting. These contracts should be an easy sell in the heart of the Texas Gulf Coast, a region that’s home to a large number of refineries, pipeline hubs, gas processing plants and import-export terminals.

With new pipelines scheduled to bring additional oil volumes from the West Texas Permian Basin, the oils sands of Canada, the Eagle Ford Shale in south Texas and the Bakken Shale of Montana and North Dakota, these storage deals should be an easy sell. Rapidly increasing oil production from these unconventional plays will necessitate a commensurate investment in infrastructure to transport and store these liquids. Oiltanking Partners is well-placed to benefit from this trend.

Drop-down transactions are a well-established and low-risk growth opportunity for MLPs. In a drop-down deal, the GP sells assets to the MLP at prices that allow the MLP to immediately increase its payout to unitholders. The best drop-down growth stories are MLPs with GPs that are well-established in the energy business and have an inventory of attractive assets. Marquard & Bahls is a privately held German energy company with terminal and storage assets in 22 countries worldwide.

Marquard & Bahls’ stateside assets include terminals in Texas City and Port Neches, Texas, and Joliet, Ill. All of these assets could be candidates for drop-down transactions. In addition the parent also owns dry-bulk handling terminals that could fit into the MLP structure. Since Marquard & Bahls regards Oiltanking Partners as a growth vehicle, I would expect a stream of drop-dawn deals.

The GP owns the incentive distribution rights (IDR) of the MLP, meaning that it receives a fee for managing the LP. For those unfamiliar with IDRs and how they’re calculated, we offered a detailed primer in the Nov. 20, 2009, issue, Faster Growing Income. Because IDRs are based on the distributions paid to common unitholders of Oiltanking Partners, the GP has a built-in incentive to increase the limited partner’s payouts over time. In addition, Marquard has retained a 73 percent ownership stake in the MLP, providing an additional incentive to pursue growth strategies that would boost the distribution.

Oiltanking Partners went public in mid-July, so the company has yet to pay quarterly distribution; brokers’ websites and Yahoo Finance indicate that the stock yields zero percent. Even after the MLP dispenses its first quarterly payout, most financial websites will persist in listing the incorrect yield until after the firm has paid four quarterly distributions.

In the MLP’s registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission, management indicated that the MLP plans to pay a minimum distribution of $0.3375 per quarter, or $1.35 per year. The third-quarter 2011 distribution will likely be prorated because the stock hasn’t been public for an entire quarter.  Nonetheless, at current prices, an annualized payout of $1.35 per unit equates to a yield of about 5.5 percent. Although that’s below-average for many MLPs, Oiltanking Partners’ low-risk, fee-based cash flow and significant growth potential justify a lower yield.

The IDRs paid to the GP begin to increase once quarterly distributions top $0.38813 per unit and again $0.42188 per unit. We would expect Oiltanking Partners to boosts its payout to $0.38813 per unit over the next 12 months. Oiltanking Partners LP rates a buy in How They Rate.

Compressco Partners LP’s (NSDQ: GSJK) cash flow isn’t locked in under long-term contracts, and the MLP has significant exposure to commodity prices, particularly US natural gas prices.
 
Compressco Partners provides production-enhancement services to natural gas producers–and some oil producers–operating mature wells.

When a producer first drills a natural gas well, the underground pressures are high; the gas from the field naturally flows into a well and to the surface. Gases and fluids tend to flow from areas of high pressure (the field) to areas of low pressure (atmospheric pressure at the surface). As fields age, these geologic pressures diminish, resulting in a steady decline in oil or gas production. At some point, reservoir pressures drop to the point that they’re lower than the pressure of the gas inside above-ground pipelines; once that point is reached, the gas no longer flows from the field into the gathering pipeline system.

Compressco Partners’ compressors increase the pressure on the gas in field to the point that it can overcome pipeline pressures. Operators also use compression equipment to re-inject the natural gas produced in a particular field to help maintain underground pressures and boost production of oil and natural gas liquids (NGL).

The MLP provides a range of ancillary services, from metering the amount of gas that comes from a well to separating the water, oil and gas produced from a field. Finally, the firm designs and manufactures its own line of compressors both for use in its own business and, at times, for outright sale.

Compressco Partners operates primarily in the US but also performs similar work in Canada, Mexico, South America and Eastern Europe.

Unfortunately for the MLP, demand for compression services varies with the price of natural gas. When the amount of natural gas in storage is high and prices are low, producers won’t be interested in engaging Compressco Partners to increase gas production from mature wells. In the worst-case scenario, producers shut in wells because there’s nowhere to store the gas that’s produced.

In its registration statement, management admits outright that its predecessor’s revenue fluctuated dramatically over the years. For example, revenue topped $26 million in the fourth quarter of 2008 and into early 2009, when US natural gas prices averaged almost $8 per million British thermal units (BTU). By the fourth quarter of 2009, gas prices tumbled to an average of less $4 per million BTU, and the company’s revenue plummeted to about $20 million per quarter.

US Natural gas prices are likely to remain deprespsed over the next few years, as output growth from prolific shale gas fields has swamped demand. Although the US should avoid an outright recession over the next 12 months, economic growth will remain decidedly subpar–hardly a recipe for robust demand growth. These challenges will limit Compressco Partners’ ability to grow its payout over time.

The MLP’s minimum quarterly distribution is set at $0.3875 per unit, or $1.55 per year. I suspect that the firm will have enough cash on hand to pay that full minimum distribution for at least its first 12 months of operations. The MLP went public on June 20, 2011, and has already made its first distribution of $0.047 per unit for the 10-days from its IPO to the end of the second quarter. This distribution is equivalent to its minimum rate of $0.3875 per quarter. Compressco Partners’ distributable cash flow covered this payout about 1.25 times. At the full minimum payout, the MLP yields north of 10 percent.

But an above-average yield doesn’t fully justify the risks of owning Compressco Partners; eventually, a decline in natural gas prices will translate to lower distributable cash flow and a lower payout. As Roger Conrad pointed out in the previous issue, returns from MLPs come from the accretion of quarterly distributions and the growth of that income stream over time. Investors need to balance that 10 percent-plus yield with Compressco Partners’ below-average distribution growth. The market appears to agree with our assessment; the MLP has underperformed since its debut. Compressco Partners LP joins our How They Rate list as a hold.

NGL Partners LP (NYSE: NGL) operates three primary business segments: retail propane supply, wholesale propane supply and midstream operations. At the time of the firm’s IPO in May, NGL’s wholesale business accounted for about 60 percent of its operating income; the midstream business contributed about 13 percent; and the retail business chipped in the remaining 27 percent.

The retail propane business involves buying propane in the wholesale market and selling it to retail customers. The firm also leases propane tanks to customers, operates a fleet of delivery trucks and runs 44 customer service locations, the majority of which are in Georgia, Illinois, Indiana and Kansas. NGL Energy Partners makes a profit based on the difference between the cost of propane it secures and the price it charges customers.

Customers primarily use propane as a source of heat, so 77 percent of the MLP’s retail business comes during heating season. Demand for propane is sensitive to weather patterns. The MLP has also reported that some customers appear to be conserving propane to cut costs in a weak economy. These factors can make it tough for NGL Energy Partners to pass along higher propane costs to its customers, limiting opportunities for margin expansion.

The wholesale business involves buying propane to supply its own retail operation or to sell to a third-party retail distributor. NGL Energy Partners also stores and transports propane on behalf of retailers, other wholesalers and refiners. Wholesale margins are also exposed to commodity prices and to variations in demand caused by economic conditions and weather patterns. The firm uses hedges and contracts to help lock in margins on part of this business and its sensitivity to the economy and commodity prices.

NGL Energy Partners’ midstream unit is a fee-based business. The company owns propane terminals in Ontario, Canada, and East St. Louis and Jefferson City, Mo. The firm receives propane from pipelines and delivers this propane customers. Fees are based on the volume of propane handled at the MLP’s terminals. In addition NGL Energy Partners sells significant volumes ahead of the winter season in an effort to reduce the impact of declining demand and volumes on its cash flow.

The company reported second-quarter results in mid-August, but we can only glean so much from this information; the second and third quarters are generally a period of weak demand for propane. But volumes met expectations in the retail business and the midstream business performed better than expected. The wholesale business, however, suffered from high propane prices that depressed demand and raised NGL Energy Partners’ procurement costs.

NGL Energy Partners’ minimum quarterly distribution is $1.35 per year, or $0.3375 per quarter. We expect the firm to be able to pay this amount for at least its first 12 months in business. At current prices, the MLP’s units yield almost 6 percent, slightly below average for an MLP. Given the company’s exposure to commodity prices and prevailing weather patterns in its core operating areas, that’s not a high enough yield to justify the risk.  

However, there’s more to this story. In late August, NGL Energy Partners announced the acquisition of NGL assets from SemGroup Corp (NYSE: SEMG) for 8.95 million units of the MLP’s stock and up to $100 million in compensation for working capital acquired when the deal closes. The deal is expected to be immediately accretive to cash flow and, more important, changes the complexion of NGL’s business for the better.

The acquired assets include 12 NGL terminals located in Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Minnesota, Washington and Wisconsin. These terminals include 12 million gallons of above-ground propane storage, 3.7 million barrels of underground NGL storage and a fleet of leased and owned railcars to transport propane and other NGLs.

This deal increases the firm’s base of terminals to 15 from three and vastly improves its geographic footprint, reducing the weather-related risks associated with operating in a single region. The new terminals also increase the size of the midstream segment, the business with the least exposure to commodity prices and propane demand.

After the announcement, the stock popped amid expectations that the new assets will enable NGL Energy Partners to boost its distributions in coming quarters and shore up coverage of its payout. While the SemGroup deal does make NGL more attractive, the current yield of 6 percent is too low to offset the MLP’s risks. We’re adding NGL Energy Partners to the How They Rate table as a hold.  

Units of American Midstream Partners LP (NSDQ: AMID), which currently has a market capitalization of less than $200 million, began trading on July 27, 2011.

American Midstream Partners’ business comprises two operating segments: gathering and processing (about two-thirds of revenue) and transmission (about one-third of revenue). Gas gathering involves small-diameter pipelines that connect individual wells to the larger pipeline network. Processing is the business of separating NGLs such as propane and butane from the raw natural gas stream. The transmission segment operates intrastate and interstate pipelines that transport processed natural gas around the country.

In total, the firm owns 1,400 miles of pipelines and gathering lines, as well as three gas processing plants. The company’s assets, which were acquired in 2009 from Enbridge Energy Partners LP (NYSE: EEP), are concentrated in the Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Texas.

The gathering and processing business has some exposure to commodity prices. When gas prices are low, drilling activity tends to fall–that means fewer well connects on American Midstream’s gathering lines. Depending on how the firm structures its contracts, the processing business can involve even more commodity risk.

About a quarter of American Midstream’s processing revenue come from fee-based arrangements that have little direct exposure to commodity prices. Fixed-margin deals account for another 20 percent of the segment’s cash flows. In these deals, the margins the MLP earns are locked in immediately when gas is processed at a fixed and predetermined margin, leaving little exposure to prices.

But percent-of-proceeds (POP) arrangements account for more than 50 percent of the segment’s cash flow. Under these contracts, American Midstream receives a designated percentage of the natural gas and NGLs it processes as compensation for its services. In other words, the amount of money American Midstream receives depends on the value of the natural gas and NGLs.

In contrast, the transmission segment is heavily fee-based and generates steady cash flow through capacity reservation deals. These charges must be paid by a shipper whether or not the full contracted capacity of the pipeline is utilized. About 80 percent of transmission margins come from these deals, while another 5 percent come from low-risk, fixed-margin transport arrangements.

In addition, management has an extensive hedging program in place that covers as much as 80 percent of the MLP’s commodity exposure through the end of 2012. This should help to mitigate near-term exposure to oil and natural gas prices.

American Midstream has a minimum quarterly distribution that works out to an annual payout of $1.65 per unit, equivalent to a yield around 8.5 percent. The company should be able to generate enough cash to cover that distribution.

The MLP also has room to grow its distribution organically and via acquisitions. The company’s transmission pipelines are underutilized, and there’s scope for American Midstream to add additional connections to its system and sign up new customers. Some of the MLP’s pipelines also pass close to the promising Tuscaloosa Marine Shale, which could lead to increased throughput.

With a relatively low debt burden, American Midstream has the scope to pursue acquisitions. The MLP’s small size means that even a modest deal could grow the firm’s distributable cash flow dramatically.

American Midstream is an MLP that’s best-suited for aggressive investors, but it offers an above-average yield and has the potential to grow its distribution significantly in coming years. American Midstream LP is a buy in our How They Rate coverage universe.